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Abstract 
Nowhere on Earth are the societal benefits of space technologies more urgently needed than in Africa. For this reason, 
the continent has, in recent years, strongly pursued and promoted space technologies and applications, as evidenced 
by the African Space Policy and Strategy (ASPS) and the African Space Agency (AfSA). The European Space Policy 
Institute (ESPI), supported by the European Space Agency (ESA), is on the forefront of researching the latest 
developments in Africa, specifically in line with AfSA's mission of exploiting space technologies and applications for 
sustainable development and the improvement of the welfare of African citizens. The “Space2030” agenda cannot 
succeed without Africa, and this recognition is reflected in its calls for bridging the space divide. The starting point in 
such an endeavour must necessarily be to identify the needs on the ground and to understand and seek ways to support 
Africa's home-grown initiatives for meeting its challenges, in line with the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). The age of Africa's full participation and partnership in space is dawning with the birth of AfSA. ESPI's 
approach in this study is to identify linchpin or primary needs within the Sustainable Development domain on which 
Africa's pursuit and promotion of space technologies and applications rely most of all. These are climate, biodiversity, 
health, water, education, and space-related capacity building. Promoting African success in harnessing space to support 
these areas, including via partnership with ESA, requires an understanding of the African international space 
ecosystem. This means understanding the continent's own Sustainable Development goals and strategies, as 
encapsulated in Agenda 2063, its existing intra-African space partnerships as well as African participation and 
partnerships in space globally, and its policies and space applications already in use. It also requires identifying African 
space growth poles in a socioeconomic landscape characterised by the abovementioned primary needs. This must also 
be supplemented by an understanding and appreciation of uniquely African worldviews such as ubuntu and the Pan-
African solidarity norm. This provides a rich contribution to International Relations scholarship and provides novel 
approaches to engaging with the collectivist African posture of seeking solutions in the space arena in a spirit of 
partnership and unity. Ultimately, engaging with Africa and its rising space nations not only benefits the continent but 
through concepts such as emerging space middle powers it becomes clear how this helps in legitimising the global 
space regime, of which “Space2030”  is a crucial part.  
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1. Introduction 
This manuscript reports on the first part of an 
ongoing, overarching study on the ways in which space 
supports Africa’s development goals [1]. For many 
observers, the image of Africa as a rising space actor is a 
surprising and often unexpected one, given the serious 
socio-economic and political challenges with which the 
continent is grappling. Nevertheless, today all of the 
continent’s 54 states are participating in the space sector 
by making use of space-related or space-derived data in 
some form, while many are participating in a variety of 
Intergovernmental and Non-Governmental 
Organisations and fora focusing on space (such as the 
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space, UNCOPUOS) with some African states becoming 
rising space actors in their own right by establishing 
national space agencies and owning (and in some cases 
even building) satellites. 
As African countries are working towards meeting 
the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) 2030 and the African Union’s Agenda 2063, the 
need to explore the role of space applications in 
supporting these efforts is urgent. In this first instalment 
of the study on space supporting Africa, the background 
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and context of Africa’s political and socio-economic 
landscape is presented and unpacked through a primary 
needs approach which focuses on climate, biodiversity, 
health, water, education, and space-related capacity 
building. African theoretical contributions from the 
International Relations field are discussed, and Africa’s 
new Space Policy and Strategy (ASPS), along with 
debates around the establishment of the African Space 
Agency (AfSA), are explored. The African International 
Space Ecosystem is analysed, including its dimensions of 
intra-African space relations and initiatives, African 
participation in UNCOPUOS, and international space 
activities, agreements, and initiatives in Africa. The final 
part is dedicated to the national space infrastructure and 
activities of African states. This lays the foundation for 
the subsequent instalments in the overarching study. This 
manuscript will present some of the findings, first 
contextualised by an overview of the continent and its 
major political and economic trends and challenges. 
 
1.1 Africa and the space arena: overview 
In order to take stock of Africa’s progress in the space 
arena, and to determine how far advanced the space 
sector is across the continent, the study examined the 
continent’s political background and context, with 
particular emphasis on the African Union and the 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that make up 
its key organs. This was then followed by an 
investigation of the general socioeconomic situation 
(including the African economy and promise of the 
‘digital renaissance’) within a framework of the primary 
needs approach to African space activities (see below). 
These identify priority areas of critical importance, which 
must be supported by space if it is to make a meaningful 
contribution to Africa’s development and the lives of 
ordinary Africans. Alongside this, concepts of ubuntu (a 
uniquely African worldview) and emerging space middle 
powers are utilised as novel frameworks to be drawn on. 
Throughout, focus is placed on the African Union’s 
Agenda 2063 as the core policy document on a 
continental level that will guide Africa towards a 
sustainable development future, in line with the SDGs. 
Methods used for ranking African space capabilities were 
reviewed, as was the background of African space 
activities up to the end of the twentieth century. A review 
was also performed of the African Space Policy and 
Strategy that frames Africa’s ‘Astronaissance’ [2], 
followed by an analysis of debates around the 
establishment of the African Space Agency.  
 
1.1.1 Africa’s political organisation 
The AU is the most politically important organisation 
on the continent, with all 54 sovereign African states as 
members, in addition to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic 
Republic. Its vision is to create “[a]n integrated, 
prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own 
citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global 
arena” [3]. The AU can be subdivided into eight 
intergovernmental organisations — the RECs — that 
constitute the ‘building blocks’ of the union, having been 
proposed as a mechanism for regional and continental 
African integration, through the Lagos Plan of Action for 
the Economic Development of Africa (1980) and the 
Abuja Treaty (1991) [4]. All 54 countries are members of 
at least one REC, with some having membership in more 
than one.  
These RECs predate the creation of the AU itself, and 
have somewhat different structures and roles, while their 
broad mandate of fostering regional economic integration 
has evolved to include coordination in wider areas such 
as governance, development, and security. The RECs are 
thus key organs of the AU. They are the Arab Maghreb 
Union (UMA), the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel-
Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the East African 
Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC).  
This study made use of the RECs in its analysis of 
African space activities and policies, for the reason that 
there have been calls for building an African Regional 
Space Regime Complex from these RECs. It has also 
been argued that each of the RECs has at least one 
national space agency, and since they are in effect the 
“implementing arm of the African Union” and the 
building blocks of its economic integration, building a 
broader continental “appetite” for space collaboration 
and integration through the RECs is thus a sensible idea 
[5]. Thus, the analysis of space-related capabilities, 
activities, and infrastructure followed a structure based 
on the RECs. 
 
1.1.2 Political challenges  
In order to provide the foundation and context for the 
analysis of the African space ecosystem, the study 
considered aspects of political challenges, since these are 
critical factors framing the role of space in Africa. These 
can only be mentioned here, but in-depth analysis is 
presented in the larger study [1]. Laudable progress in 
democratisation and governance is being made across 
Africa, but many political challenges still confront 
African countries and threaten socio-economic 
development and progress in sectors, including space. 
Many countries are still politically fragile, while 
corruption remains a serious challenge. Political rights 
and civil liberties (including electoral processes, political 
pluralism and participation, the functioning of 
government, issues of expression and belief, personal 
autonomy and individual rights, associational and 
organisational rights) and the rule of law pose numerous 
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challenges and on many of these fronts Africa performs 
poorly. Peace and security is another political arena 
where many challenges remain. In recent times, Africa 
has also grappled with several major refugee and 
migration crises, including major internal displacements, 
while discrimination and marginalisation is also rampant, 
especially for women and girls, people with albinism, and 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex people. 
The political challenges in Africa thus remain 
significant. However, a key realisation is that Africa has 
not remained passive in the face of these challenges. One 
of the core concepts used as both an expression of 
Africa’s hope for the future and a driver of change is that 
of the African Renaissance. Its aim is a “golden age of 
Africa’s social economic and political institution 
building through good governance and improved state-
society relations” [6]. The African Renaissance became 
the vision to inspire, and create fertile ground for, the 
rebirth of the continent.  
Agenda 2063 is the core policy document on a 
continental level that will guide Africa towards a 
sustainable development future, in line with the SDGs. 
At its core, Agenda 2063 is a strategic framework that 
builds on and accelerates previous and current initiatives 
to achieve sustainable development and economic 
growth and lays the foundation for the socio-economic 
transformation of Africa over a 50-year period. Agenda 
2063 furthermore identifies 12 key flagship projects for 
the continent, one of which is the Africa Outer Space 
Strategy. The aim of this flagship programme is to 
strengthen the use of outer space to support and reinforce 
Africa’s development. It encapsulates the recognition 
that African development is critically dependent on outer 
space and space technology. Moreover, it contends that 
the products of space technology are “no longer a matter 
of luxury” and access to space technology and products 
must be sped up [7]. It also recognises that satellite 
technology is more accessible than ever to African 
countries. The Agenda 2063 framework was 
incorporated throughout the study since all development, 
including in the space sector, must speak to Africa’s own 
developmental goals. 
 
1.1.3 Socio-economic overview 
To further contextualise the African space sector, an 
in-depth analysis was conducted on the broad socio-
economic state of affairs on the continent. This included 
the main challenges confronting  Africa, since the use of 
space technology in Africa must speak to these 
challenges in order to be viewed as valuable and 
successful.  
Dimensions analysed included gross national income 
per capita, human development, Gini coefficient 
(inequality), percentage of population living on less than 
$1.90 a day (at 2011 international prices), dominant 
sectors driving African economies, largest employment 
sectors, leading contributing sectors to GDP, economic 
complexity, annual GDP growth rates, business 
environment, and global competitiveness. Special focus 
was placed on information and communications 
technologies which have revolutionised the African 
economic landscape, especially smartphones, and the 
broader African digital revolution and its related 
challenges.  
 
2. Theoretical frameworks and contributions 
Two important concepts were used throughout the 
study both as theoretical frameworks and contributions to 
the space literature, namely ubuntu and emerging space 
middle powers. This is a novel endeavour since ubuntu, 
as a unique African worldview and international relations 
perspective, has never been coupled with the space arena. 
The emerging space middle powers concept, along with 
ubuntu, helps to further an understanding of how Africa’s 
regional powers fit into the global system and to give 
explanations to their behaviour and actions, particularly 
on continental level. This is useful since African space 
initiatives are largely driven by regional powers (also 
explaining the core focus on the RECs).  
There has been a recent effort in the field of IR theory 
to seek non-Western, including African, concepts to 
enrich a discipline that is still primarily dominated by 
work from the United States and Europe [8]. One such 
concept is ubuntu, which reinforces the notion of Smith 
[8] that Africa has always possessed agency in world 
system and has not simply been “acted upon” by others. 
This agency has been clarified by arguing that its 
uniqueness “lies in its qualification ‘African’ which is 
both self and place bound” and the role of Afrocentricity 
within this agency is critical in the sense that 
“Afrocentricity emerges as a methodology that 
consciously operates within African ways of knowing 
and existence and results in the implementation of 
principles, methods, concepts and ideas that are derived 
from our own African cultural experiences” [9]. 
However, no attempt has been made to bring such unique 
African insights into the outer space literature, and even 
in the International Relations theory field it is a new 
development. The first concept here, ubuntu has been 
argued to be an indigenous worldview, and although the 
word itself originates from Southern Africa, specifically 
the Nguni language family, manifestations of ubuntu can 
be found across Africa, legitimising it as an African view 
of the international [8]. The term ubuntu is encapsulated 
in the well-known isiXhosa proverb Ubuntu ungamntu 
ngabanye abantu, which means “people are people 
through other people” [8]. Its value in IR, and thus space 
literature, is that it puts forth an alternative collectivist 
understanding in contrast to the Western individualist 
ontology [10]. Ubuntu is a valuable tool in IR since it can 
explain behaviour among African states, and helps to 
shed light on the pan-African solidarity norm, for 
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example, as well as the reasoning behind Africa’s 
preferred form of international engagement, namely 
multilateralism.  
The second concept incorporated is that of emerging 
middle powers. The middle power literature is well-
established in IR, but an important adjustment was made 
by a South African scholar to distinguish between 
traditional and emerging middle powers [11]. By 
unpacking this concept of emerging middle powers, it 
can be adapted into a framework allowing the 
identification of several emerging ‘space middle powers’ 
in Africa that uphold the international order in space. 
This concept of emerging space middle powers also 
contains an important distinction from that of more 
traditional regional powers. The features of regional 
powers are summarised as states that conceive of 
themselves as leaders in their region, possess power 
projection capabilities, influence regional affairs, 
influence the ‘political-ideational construction’ of their 
region, use their influence in regional governance 
structures, strongly influence the regional security 
agenda, present a common regional identity or project, 
provide or assist in providing a collective good for the 
region, are recognised globally for their regional 
leadership, and represent their regions in global fora. If 
the active participation of all (or most) African states in 
the space arena is to be achieved, the role of the emerging 
space middle powers in legitimising the governance 
structures and ‘status quo’ (treaties, etc.) in the space 
arena is crucial. These emerging space middle powers 
must be the bridge between Africa and outer space.  
These two concepts – ubuntu and emerging space 
middle powers – are incorporated throughout the study. 
The next section will reflect on the models created to aid 
the analysis of the African international space ecosystem. 
 
3. Models  
Throughout our study, models were created and used 
to guide and frame each of the major sections. These 
models are summarised here. The first of these is the 
primary needs approach to African space activities model 
(Fig. 1.). As space and space-related products and 
services are now more deeply integrated into daily life 
than ever, their impacts on those priority areas that are of 
critical importance for improving human development 
and welfare in Africa are placed at the centre of our study.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Primary needs approach to African space activities  
model 
 
All human activity and welfare depend powerfully on 
the climate and on biodiversity, and these areas are thus 
placed at the foundation of the model. They directly feed 
into health and water. Education, without which no 
lasting, genuine progress can be made in the space sector 
or any other, is also here regarded as a primary need, 
since it empowers people to transform society in line with 
the SDGs. This then feeds into space-related capacity 
building, which, in its turn, is a primary need for the 
African space sector to take off and address the socio-
economic development needs of the continent. All these 
factors then directly feed into Africa’s space activities 
and infrastructure. These then filter back into the areas of 
climate, biodiversity, health, water, education, and space-
related capacity building since space activities, services, 
and technologies are used to support these.  
An important note here is that these primary needs are 
all closely linked to the SDGs. Climate is linked to SDG 
13 (“Take urgent action to combat climate change and its 
impacts”), biodiversity is linked to SDG 14 (“Conserve 
and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources 
for sustainable development”) and SDG 15 (“Protect, 
restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial 
ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat 
desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and 
halt biodiversity loss”), health is linked to SDG 3 
(“Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at 
all ages”), water is linked to SDG 6 (“Ensure availability 
and sustainable management of water and sanitation for 
all”), education is linked to SDG 4 (“Ensure inclusive and 
equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning 
opportunities for all”), and space-related capacity 
building is arguably linked to SDG 9 (“Build resilient 
infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable 
industrialization and foster innovation”) [12]. 
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The second model was used to analyse the African 
international space ecosystem (Fig. 2.).  
 
 
Fig. 2. African international space ecosystem model 
 
This international ecosystem is conceptualised as 
consisting of three dimensions. The first of these 
dimensions concerns intra-African space relations and 
activities taking place between various countries on the 
continent. The second dimension revolves around 
African relations and participation in international fora, 
with emphasis on UNCOPUOS. The third dimension is 
concerned with the involvement of international space 
actors on the African continent, as well as various other 
international agreements and initiatives. 
In terms of intra-African space relations and 
activities, the analysis included the discussion of various 
continental projects taking place such as the African 
Resource Management Satellite Constellation (ARMS-
C), the Square Kilometre Array (SKA), and others. These 
were analysed through the Intra-African Space 
Engagement (IASE) Matrix, a tool that helps to identify 
emerging space middle power candidates via the regional 
dimensions of the middle powers concept (see theoretical 
framework below). Here, a matrix is understood as the 
cultural, social, or political environment ‘substrate’, in 
this case, specifically for the use of space to meet primary 
needs in Africa. The environment in this case is made up 
of the various IGOs and NGOs discussed in depth in the 
study, which all serve individually as vehicles for 
developing the use of space and collectively as a web or 
network of African space-related organisations, 
relationships, and activities.  
The next step is to explicate the methodology used in 
the creation of the IASE Matrix. While all of these 
organisations play critical roles in promoting space 
technologies, data, or skills, for the purpose of producing 
the IASE Matrix, two points were assigned to each 
African country for membership in an IGO or for hosting 
the activities or conferences of an IGO, whereas 
involvement in the NGOs were assigned one point. The 
reason for this distinction is because when a state joins 
an organisation, it signifies greater national involvement 
in promoting space activities than when their citizens 
found or join a space-related NGO. The aim was thus to 
provide a general indication of which countries are more 
active players in intra-African space affairs and thus to 
create an image of patterns of intra-African relations and 
activities. The IASE Matrix thus simplifies a very 
complex field in order to facilitate comparison. 
Moreover, while countries received a score for 
participating in an organisation or project, they received 
an additional point if they were a host nation. This is 
because “experience with African continental 
organisations has shown that the host country winds up 
shouldering the lion’s share of the financial burden of 
sustaining such entities” [13]. The findings of the IASE 
Matrix will be presented in the next section. 
The second dimension of the African international 
space ecosystem is that of involvement in international 
space fora, most notably UNCOPUOS. This was in turn 
analysed through the International Space Engagement 
(ISE) Matrix, which identified emerging space middle 
power candidates based on the international dimensions 
of the concept. Together, the IASE and ISE Matrices 
identified Africa’s emerging space middle powers and 
help to account for their actions, along with ubuntu, 
within the international space ecosystem. The ISE Matrix 
considers whether states are members of UNCOPUOS or 
have assumed leadership positions within the main or 
subcommittees, whether they are active members of 
UNCOPUOS, whether the core outer space treaties have 
been ratified, and to gauge African engagement in the 
broader United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs 
(UNOOSA) architecture. Other factors were also 
considered including: participation and hosting of 
regional offices of the United Nations Platform for 
Space-based Information for Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER), appointing of a 
National Focal Point as requested by UN-SPIDER of all 
member states, and hosting of a Regional Centre for 
Space Science and Technology Education. This helps to 
provide a more complete picture of African engagement 
with UNCOPUOS and UNOOSA. All of these factors 
were combined to create the ISE Matrix. To make the ISE 
Matrix meaningful, higher scores were assigned for 
greater engagement. Thus, scores are assigned as 
follows: signing a treaty, 1 point; ratifying a treaty, 2 
points; being an UNCOPUOS member, 3 points; being 
an active participant (attending more than half of all 
sessions from 2015 to 2018), 4 points; chairing any 
committee, 4 points; participating in UNOOSA’s African 
institutions (UN-SPIDER National Focal Point), 3 
points; and hosting one of these institutions (UN-
SPIDER Regional Office or Regional Centre for Space 
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Science and Technology Education), 4 points. The 
findings of the ISE Matrix are also presented in section 
4. As with the IASE Matrix, it is possible to identify the 
‘outliers’ in international space engagement based on the 
ISE score assigned to each country.  
A third model used in this study presents the 
interlinked nature of the analysis, and focused on 
identifying African space growth poles (Fig. 3. – see end 
of document). This incorporated aspects of Africa’s 
relations in the space arena and participation and 
engagement on the continent and beyond, capabilities of 
African states with regard to space-related infrastructure 
and national space activities, and frameworks used in the 
analysis of these activities, grounded in the socio-
economic landscape of Africa (and primary needs in 
particular). 
In relation to the frameworks employed, these are 
drawn from the relevant literature, which presents a 
variety of frameworks to facilitate analysis of national 
space capabilities. The first approach, taken by Wood and 
Weigel [14], uses a Space Technology Ladder to provide 
a framework to chart the path countries have taken in 
terms of their technological capacity in space technology. 
Wood and Weigel’s Space Technology Ladder is also 
useful since it allows for the creation of a graphical 
timeline, comparing the achievements of various African 
countries (see the next section for findings in terms of this 
study). The Space Technology Ladder was modified in 
line with six main shortcomings found in related 
literature, and the modified version that includes 16 
milestones is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Modified Space Technology Ladder 
 
 
4. Launch 
Capability 
16. Astronaut to space 
15. Satellite to GEO 
14. Satellite to LEO 
 
 
 
3. MEO/GEO 
Satellite 
13. Build locally 
12. Build through mutual 
international collaboration 
11. Build locally with outside 
assistance 
10. Procure 
 
 
 
 
2. LEO Satellite 
9. Build locally 
8. Build through mutual 
international collaboration 
7. Build locally with outside 
assistance 
6. Build with support in 
partner’s facility 
5. Procure with training 
services 
 4. Establish space AIT 
centre/space industry 
1. Establishing 
Space Policy, 
Agency and 
Infrastructure 
3. Establish current national 
space agency [critical factor 
for High/Medium/Low 
Space Technology 
Countries] 
2. Establish first government 
space office 
1. Establish first government 
space policy 
 
The second framework used was created by Harding 
[15] and provides a larger picture that identifies two main 
groups of countries. The first group is the category of 
developed space actors (DVSAs). The second group is 
that of emerging space actors (EMSAs), and was of main 
interest in this study. This category is itself further 
subdivided into three tiers. The first-tier EMSAs are the 
largest and most capable states within their group and are 
China, India, and Brazil. More important for this study 
are the second- and third-tier EMSAs, which Harding 
describes as “smaller but no less enthusiastic states [that] 
now make up the majority of the world’s space actors” 
[15]. A point that has to be underscored is that it “has 
become apparent . . . that a nation does not need to have 
a satellite in space to be space capable”, for example, 
“[s]everal countries are space capable, are avid users of 
Earth observation data, and do not yet have any specific 
space-based assets of their own” [16]. 
 The third framework that adds more detail than the 
Space Technology Ladder is the European Space 
Agency’s Technology Readiness Level (TRL). Although 
this TRL is more technical in nature, it is not difficult to 
see some overlap with Wood and Weigel’s ladder when 
viewed in a broader sense. The TRL consists of nine 
levels, increasing in complexity, and while it is not 
applied in great depth in this study, it nevertheless helped 
to inform analysis of African space capabilities and 
activities. The next section will present the findings of 
the study, as well as the related discussion in terms of the 
frameworks and models used. However, additional 
analyses conducted as part of the study, including on the 
primary needs areas, history of Africa’s space efforts, 
debates around the African Space Agency, space-related 
budgets, scientific output, and terrestrial infrastructure 
cannot be included here due to space limitations.   
 
4. Findings and discussion  
From the application of the IASE Matrix, it becomes 
clear that every country in Africa is involved in at least 
some capacity in the space sector, apart from merely 
being a user of space data. A very clear picture also 
emerges in terms of which countries are leaders in intra-
African space engagement. This is where the concept of 
emerging space middle powers comes to the fore. To 
summarise, a middle power is a country that is neither 
particularly great nor small on the international stage in 
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terms of its power, capacity, or influence, and which 
tends to uphold and support the international order or 
status quo. Thus middle powers do not challenge but 
legitimise and stabilise that word order. Middle powers 
also strongly favour multilateral initiatives in order to 
build consensus and legitimacy. However, as mentioned, 
there is a distinction between traditional (developed) and 
emerging (developing) middle powers, in that emerging 
middle powers do not typically have fully consolidated 
democracies; tend to place more emphasis on economic 
matters, equity, and justice than on military or political 
ones; fall into the medium human development category; 
are regionally dominant and tend to be drivers of regional 
structures in which they are dominant; have a more 
neutral global posture; and are more active participants 
of international organisations dominated by the South 
[11]. 
Based on these features, it is possible to produce a 
framework to identify and classify the emerging space 
nations of Africa, based on the hypothesis that emerging 
middle powers of Africa will carry forth these principles 
in their space postures as well.  
The expectations on a regional level following from 
the hypothesis here is that African space middle powers 
(i) place a strong emphasis on the socio-economic 
benefits of space technology as opposed to military or 
security objectives and (ii) strongly favour and drive 
regional and continental efforts to create space 
institutions and structures (including policy) in Africa 
while taking a leading or dominant position in these. 
Based on the IASE score assigned to each country, it is 
possible to identify the ‘outliers’ in intra-African space 
engagement. In order to arrive at a conception of African 
emerging space middle powers, the concept of power 
also needs to be accounted for. However, power can be 
defined in many different ways and is highly subjective. 
For the purposes here, a study and model used to score 
and rank countries developed by Y&R’s BAV Group and 
the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania 
was utilised [17]. Once again, it should be emphasised 
that this is not being used to assign ‘value’ to countries 
but to gain a better understanding of emerging space 
middle powers in Africa.  
Based on the findings presented in Table 2, nine 
African emerging space middle power candidates are 
identified according to their perceived international 
power and IASE score. These are Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, 
Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and 
Tunisia. However, this does not yet reflect the 
international dimension of whether these countries 
actively support the international order or status quo in 
space, and thus the next matrix will delve into this 
dimension and complete the picture. Nevertheless, six 
categories of African states are revealed—those which 
are (i) more powerful and leaders in space engagement, 
(ii) those which are more powerful and well-engaged, 
(iii) those which are more powerful and not well-
engaged, (iv) those which are less powerful and leaders 
in space engagement, (v) those which are less powerful 
and well-engaged, and (vi) those which are less powerful 
and not well-engaged.  
 
Table 2. Six categories of African states based on power 
and space engagement 
 IASE 
Above 
Mean 
IASE 
Above 
Median 
IASE Below 
Median 
More 
Powerful 
Algeria, 
Egypt, 
Ghana, 
Kenya, 
Morocco, 
Nigeria, 
South 
Africa, 
Tanzania, 
Tunisia 
 Angola 
Less 
Powerful 
Burkina 
Faso, 
Cameroon, 
Côte 
d'Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, 
Guinea-
Bissau, 
Mali, 
Mauritius, 
Namibia, 
Niger, 
Republic 
of Congo, 
Senegal, 
Sudan, 
Uganda, 
Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
Benin, 
Libya,  
Madagas-
car  
Botswana, 
Burundi, 
Cape Verde, 
Central 
African 
Republic, 
Chad, 
Comoros, 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
Djibouti, 
Equatorial 
Guinea, 
Eritrea, 
Gabon, 
Guinea, 
Lesotho, 
Liberia, 
Malawi, 
Mauritania, 
Mozambique, 
Rwanda, São 
Tomé and 
Príncipe, 
Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, 
South Sudan, 
Swaziland, 
Gambia, 
Togo 
 
Those states that are perceived as powerful and are 
leaders in their space engagement are the above-
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mentioned candidates for Africa’s emerging space 
middle powers—situated at the inner core of the 
continent’s network of space-related organisations, 
relationships, and activities speaking to primary needs. In 
the outer core are those 15 states that perform very well 
in their space engagement, but are not considered to be 
very powerful, and thus in a sense these states are 
‘punching above their weight’, showing a concerted 
effort to take part in the continent’s space sector. At the 
periphery lie those states that are less powerful and 
received an IASE score below the median. These 
represent the untapped potential of the intra-African 
space arena, since these particular 27 states are at the 
lower end of the space engagement spectrum. Between 
the core and periphery lies the semiperiphery, with three 
less powerful states performing better than the median 
but not better than the mean in their IASE scores. Benin, 
Libya, and Madagascar can thus be argued to be rising 
African space actors in this regard. 
Next, it is necessary to consider the dimension of 
Africa’s relationships and participation in international 
space fora. In terms of such fora, UNCOPUOS is by far 
the most significant, As such, Africa’s involvement in 
this body was analysed by way of the International Space 
Engagement (ISE) Matrix, which supplements the 
previously discussed Intra-African Space Engagement 
(IASE) Matrix by considering the international 
dimension of Africa’s space engagement. UNCOPUOS 
is especially important here because middle powers are 
known by their global roles, not only their regional ones, 
and the international order in outer space (and other 
fields) is embodied by the UN. Moreover, since 
UNCOPUOS is the global governance forum for outer 
space, its activities are comprehensive and highly 
relevant to all basic needs. Apart from active 
participation in UNCOPUOS, another critical indicator 
of engagement in international space affairs is whether 
states have signed or ratified the five major space-related 
treaties. Doing so is not dependent on being an 
UNCOPUOS member, but African states in general have 
been slow to accede to these treaties. A total of 19 states 
have neither signed nor ratified any of the treaties. Only 
one, Morocco, has ratified all five treaties, while only 
four others have ratified all treaties apart from the Moon 
Agreement. Africa’s international engagement in this 
regard is thus lacklustre, possibly again due to the 
misconception that it is to a large extent irrelevant for 
developing countries with other priorities. Findings are 
presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Twelve categories of African states based on 
economy and space engagement 
 A)  
ISE 
Above 
Mean 
B)  
ISE 
Above 
Median 
C)  
ISE Below 
Median 
1) High-
Incom
e 
Seychelle
s 
  
2) Upper-
Middle
-
Incom
e 
Algeria, 
Libya, 
South 
Africa 
 Botswana, 
Equatorial 
Guinea, 
Gabon, 
Mauritius, 
Namibia 
3) Lower-
Middle
-
Incom
e 
Egypt, 
Kenya,  
Morocco, 
Nigeria, 
Tunisia, 
Zambia 
Cameroon
, Ghana, 
Sudan 
Angola, 
Cape Verde, 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
Côte 
d'Ivoire, 
Djibouti, 
Lesotho, 
Mauritania, 
São Tomé 
and Príncipe, 
Swaziland 
4) Low-
Incom
e 
Burkina 
Faso, 
Niger, 
Senegal 
Benin, 
Burundi, 
Sierra 
Leone, 
Togo 
Central 
African 
Republic, 
Chad, 
Comoros, 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, 
The Gambia, 
Guinea, 
Guinea-
Bissau, 
Liberia, 
Madagascar, 
Malawi, 
Mali, 
Mozambiqu
e, Rwanda, 
Somalia, 
South 
Sudan, 
Tanzania, 
Uganda, 
Zimbabwe 
 
By combining the factors of treaty signature or 
ratification, UNCOPUOS membership, active 
participation in UNCOPUOS, chairing or UNCOPUOS 
or its subcommittees, participating in UN-SPIDER, and 
hosting a Regional Centre for Space Science and 
Technology Education, it was possible to clearly identify 
those states that are strong proponents of the existing 
international order and its multilateral arrangements and 
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which, by virtue of their strong engagement, become 
African ‘representatives’ or mediators for the entire 
continent. As with the IASE Matrix, it is possible to 
identify the ‘outliers’ in international space engagement 
based on the ISE score assigned to each country. It thus 
becomes possible to identify leaders based on the 
international dimension of space engagement. The 
leaders in this regard are (in descending order) Nigeria, 
Algeria, Morocco, South Africa, Kenya, Tunisia, Egypt, 
Burkina Faso, Libya, Niger, Senegal, Zambia, and 
Seychelles. A small number of states do not score at or 
above the mean but nevertheless score at or above the 
median, which divides the continent between 21 more 
internationally engaged and 33 less internationally 
engaged states.  
While the picture presented by the ISE (and IASE) 
scores do not necessarily provide an exhaustive account 
of all African engagement with space, a very clear trend 
emerges nevertheless, and again the purpose behind 
compiling these scores is not to ‘value’ states or their 
engagement but to illuminate the main patterns thereof. 
Similar to how the Intra-African Space Engagement 
Matrix was combined with the concept of power to 
narrow the emerging space middle power candidates, 
here, the economic dimension in terms of gross national 
income (GNI) per capita was be combined with the 
International Space Engagement Matrix. An argument 
regarding limited funds can be made to partially explain 
the absence within UNCOPUOS of Niger, Benin, Chad, 
Sierra Leone, and Senegal—all classified as low-income 
economies by the World Bank. While the exception of 
Burkina Faso does stand out in this regard, just as a less 
powerful state will have difficulty fulfilling the role of a 
middle power, so too will a low-income economy. This 
is again not a fixed rule but is a helpful heuristic device. 
Based on these findings, 12 categories of African 
states can be identified (as represented in Table 3 above). 
These are defined by the level of the economy and the 
ISE score of all 54 states. Again, a core, periphery, and 
semi-periphery are apparent. In the core, a pattern 
emerges that shows that countries with high levels of 
international space engagement are spread out 
throughout all economic categories. Thus, a key finding 
is that other factors such as political will must be the 
primary drivers of national space engagement and cannot 
be discounted, while awareness and outreach efforts must 
continue. In this low-income category, while both Niger 
and Senegal score above the mean despite not being 
active UNCOPUOS members, the true outlier is Burkina 
Faso given its dedication in attending each UNCOPUOS 
session in the last 4 years (2015–2018). It can thus be 
argued that Burkina Faso has shown a high level of 
political will to drive a concerted effort to take part and 
cooperate in the space arena, although the factor of 
maintaining an embassy in Vienna does make it easier for 
Burkina Faso to attend UNCOPUOS meetings. 
Conversely, it could be argued that the upper-middle-
income countries of Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, and Namibia are underperformers since none of 
them have joined UNCOPUOS despite Namibia’s 
attendance as observer, and Namibia also maintains an 
embassy in Vienna. 
In the case of the ISE scores, the entire core category 
can thus be considered as emerging space middle power 
candidates, since it has been shown that space 
engagement does not depend on levels of economic 
development. Thus, the 13 high scoring states were be 
compared to the list of candidates from the IASE Matrix 
(combined with power perception) discussed earlier, to 
find the African emerging space middle powers (Table 4 
depicts these per REC). In terms of the African RECs, all 
are represented by at least one emerging space middle 
power candidate, with the notable exception of ECCAS. 
However, ECCAS does have other outer core members. 
The core states in each of the RECs are thus the regional 
leaders and positioned to be the drivers and promoters of 
infusing space into African societies to assist meeting 
primary needs.  
The result of this analysis reveals the emerging space 
middle powers, and thus the continental leaders to be 
Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, 
and Tunisia. These seven countries must play the main 
leadership role for Africa to meet its goals and targets set 
out in the AU’s Agenda 2063 first 10-year 
implementation plan. 
 
Table 4. Emerging space middle powers by regional 
economic community 
 Emerging Space 
Middle Powers 
Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) Algeria, Morocco, 
Tunisia 
Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) 
Egypt, Kenya, 
Tunisia 
Community of Sahel–
Saharan States (CEN–SAD) 
Egypt, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Kenya, 
Tunisia  
East African Community 
(EAC) 
Kenya 
Economic Community of 
Central African States 
(ECCAS) 
Cameroon, 
Republic of Congo 
Economic Community of 
West African States 
(ECOWAS) 
Nigeria 
Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD) 
Kenya  
Southern African 
Development Community 
(SADC) 
South Africa 
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Following this analysis, the adapted Space Technology 
Ladder discussed previously was applied per REC to 
identify the progress of major space technology 
achievements in Africa. The findings are presented below 
(Fig. 4–8; Note: since many African states are members 
of more than one REC, each was included only once to 
avoid duplication). Detailed analysis was performed in 
line with the frameworks discussed earlier (such as 
Harding’s EMSA framework), as well an in-depth 
investigation into the space sector and satellites of each 
country (see [1]). 
 
 
Fig. 4. Milestone timeline—Arab Maghreb Union 
 
 
Fig. 5. Milestone timeline—Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
 
 
Fig. 6. Milestone timeline—Community of Sahel-
Saharan States (CEN-SAD) 
 
 
Fig. 7. Milestone timeline—Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS) 
 
 
Fig. 8. Milestone timeline—Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) 
 
5. Conclusions  
The study aimed to complete the picture, presented in 
Fig. 3, of Africa’s space growth poles by utilising the 
modified Space Technology Ladder, Harding’s emerging 
space actor framework, and some basic concepts from the 
European Space Agency’s Technology Readiness Level 
framework (such as reports of basic principles observed 
regarding upcoming satellites, concepts, and functions). 
Together with the analysis of African space engagement, 
these capability and infrastructure considerations now 
allow conclusions to be drawn regarding Africa’s space 
growth poles and emerging space middle powers in the 
context of primary needs. 
Strong upward trajectories in terms of milestone 
achievements are visible in a range of countries across 
the continent. The most prominent are Algeria, Egypt, 
Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa and, to a lesser (but no 
less significant) extent, Angola, Ethiopia, Tunisia, 
Morocco, and Ghana, with others showing promise as 
well. Combined with an assessment of their status within 
the EMSA framework, it was possible to identify 
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Africa’s space growth poles, as well as to provide an 
updated assessment of the continent’s space sector. This 
was done by combining engagement in space and 
national space capabilities and identifying national 
trajectories and key focus areas based on the analysis 
above. The findings reinforce the sense of the rapid pace 
at which African states have been increasing their space-
related capabilities and while Harding argued that South 
Africa was a second-tier EMSA in 2013, two more states 
can arguably be counted in that category today, with two 
more approaching that point through development of 
significant capabilities in terms of space technology.  
Institutionally, African states have also been 
expanding their capabilities, with Zimbabwe a very 
recent example. This reflects the recognition among 
African leaders and decision-makers of the value and 
importance of space for societal development. The 
analysis, by way of the modified Space Technology 
Ladder, also made it possible to compare the approaches 
or pathways of countries in pursuing space capabilities. 
Egypt and Angola have, for instance, placed great 
emphasis on communication via their NileSat and 
AngoSat programmes—recently also joined by Algeria 
with its AlComSat-1. Morocco, on the other hand, has 
pursued high-resolution Earth observation for both 
developmental and military objectives, turning to foreign 
manufacturers to provide these sophisticated tools. 
Meanwhile, Kenya, Ghana, Mauritius and, in some cases, 
Morocco and South Africa have developed satellites and 
engineering skills via international initiatives such as the 
Birds programme, or the TUBSAT programme, or other 
collaborations such as ThinSat. This is often reflective of 
the initial efforts of countries to build up a cadre of space 
professionals and clearly demonstrates the 
democratisation and opening up of space to developing 
nations through the small satellite revolution. Algeria, 
Nigeria, and South Africa have also focused heavily on 
developing their domestic manufacturing capabilities, 
and in all three cases, this has been guided by a clear 
strategy, driven by a responsible space authority. Egypt 
is also joining in this effort via its new Space City 
development (and is also hosting AfSA), as is Tunisia via 
its Sfax Technopole project, and thus these states form 
the core of what was referred to above as the African 
Regional Space Regime Complex.  
Via the frameworks utilised in this study, it is thus 
possible to identify comparable groups of countries based 
on their space sector initiatives. South Africa, Nigeria, 
and Algeria form the core, and Egypt and Tunisia are 
approaching the core, while Kenya, Morocco, Ghana, 
Angola, and Ethiopia are key rising space actors, with 
Gabon, Sudan, Libya, Mauritius, Rwanda, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Zimbabwe, 
Côte d’Ivoire, and Namibia undertaking establishment of 
their capabilities. This study has also reinforced the sense 
of overlap between the RECs, which serves to strengthen 
the need for continental coordination via AfSA, for 
example. However, it is also clear that this overlap is 
good for building the African Regional Space Regime 
Complex and reinforces the power of space to overcome 
divisions within the RECs, and thus across Africa.  
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Fig. 3. Identifying African space growth poles 
 
 
 
